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RECENT CASES
The policy reflected by the instant case in refusing to uphold a use clear-
ly not public and in restricting an even greater expansion of the "public
use" concept is encouraging to that ever diminishing minority which re-
mains steadfast in its dedication to the proposition that individual rights
are of far greater and more lasting worth than governmental aid. "The
law of each age is ultimately what that age thinks should be the law." 23
That the courts, with certain notable exceptions, have made the most per-
spicacious choice in the field of eminent domain is open to question.
H. M. PIPPIN
CONTRACTS - PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL - CHARITABLE SUBSCIUPTIONS. -
Plaintiff signed as guarantor several notes of a hospital building associa-
tion, blank except for amount, so that it might make loans and secure
building contracts. The association, relying on plaintiff's promise, had
entered into the contracts when plaintiff became dissatisfied with the type
of hospital being built, and demanded back the unused notes. The associa-
tion refused to return them. In an action to enjoin negotiation of the notes
judgment was entered for the defendants. On appeal it was held, that the
judgment be affirmed. Plaintiff's promise of guaranty became binding
when the charity, in reliance thereon, put itself into a position from which
it could not extricate itself without substantial injury.1  Danby v. Osteo-
pathic Hospital Association, 104 A.2d 903 (Delaware 1954).
The early English and American cases regarded promises of money made-
to charitable organizations as nudum pactum since the very nature of the
undertaking indicates a gift with no expectation of consideration. 2 Later
decisions, however, have tended to enforce the promises whenever possible
as a matter of policy.3 Courts have sought refuge in a variety of theories
in order that they might find consideration. 4 Some courts have found a
consideration in the donee's "promise" to apply the subscriptions to the
purposes of the institution. 5 Others hvae considered the promise as a uni-
lateral offer which becomes binding as soon as the subscription has beep
accepted and liabilities incurred by the charity,6 and a few courts have held
that the promise of each subscriber is consideration for the promise of the
23. See People ex rel Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N.Y. 429, 450, 130 N.E.
601, 608 (1921).
1. The doctrine of promissory estoppel invoked by the court has been defined as. "A
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise." Restatement, Contracts §90 (1933).
2. Phillips, Limerick Academy v. Davis, 11 Mass. 113(1814); See 1 Williston on Con-
tracts 403(Rev. ed. 1936).
3. In re Lord's Will, 175 Misc. 921, 25 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1941); More Game Birds in
America Inc. v. Boettger, 125 N.J.L. 97, 14 A.2d 778(1940).
4. At least one early case held that a moral obligation was sufficient. Caul v. Gibson,
3 Pa. St. 416(18i6).
5. Rogers v. Galloway Female College, 64 Ark. 627, 44 S.W. 454(1898); Rothen-
berger v. Glick, 22 Ind. App. '288, 52 N.E. 811 ,1899); Albert Lea College v. Brown, 88
Minn. 524, 93 N.W. 672(1903).
6, I & I Holding Corporation v. Gainsburg, 276 N.Y. 427, 12 N.E.2d 532(1938);
Kueka College v. Ray, 167 N.Y. 96, 60 N.E. 325(1901); See In re Lord's Will, 175 Mcsi.
921, 25 N.Y.S.2d 747,751 (1941).
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others.7 Another theory, and the one adopted by the court in the instant
case is that the promisor may be estopped to assert want of consideration.'
The present discussion will be limited to this concept of promissory estoppel.0
It has been said that the purpose of the doctrine of promissory estoppel
is to avoid the harsh. consequences resulting from allowing the promisor to
repudiate, after the promisee has acted in reliance upon the promise.1 a
In most cases before estoppel applies, the promisor must contemplate some
specific act to be performed by the beneficiary acting in reliance upon the
pledge,11 but at least one case 12 extended the scope of the meaning of
reliance to include general charitable acts. In that case a promise of money
was made to aid a hospital in its humanitarian work. The promisor was
held liable even though the hospital had in the past been engaged in
charitable work and probably would have continued to do such work even
if the promise had not been made.
In the usual "gift to charity" case, a promise of money is made.:; In the
instant case, however, the plaintiff promised his credit. The court felt
there was no practical difference between the two. Ordinarily, in an ac-
tion on a guaranty, the controversy is between the guarantee (lender) and
the guarantor.' 4 In that situation, the rule is that an offer of guaranty
may be revoked if the guaranty has been signed without previous request
of a guarantee, and in his absence, for no consideration except future ad-
vancements to be made to the principal debtor, unless there has been noti-
fication of acceptance by the guarantee. 15 Thus, while it may well be that
the guarantee has relied on the guarantor's promise to his detriment, it
is doubtful if the doctrine of promissory estoppel would be applied, for
7. Allen v. Duffy. 43 Mich. 1, 4 N.W. 427(1880); See Rothenberger v. Glick, 22
Ind. App. 288, 52 N.E. 811, 812 (1899). Contras Presbyterian Church of Albany V.
Cooper, 112 N.Y. 517, 21 N.E. 352(1889). "It proceeds on the assumption that a
:tranger both to the consideration and the promise, and whose only relation to the "ransac-
tion is that of a donee of an cxecutory gift, may sue to enforce the payment of the
gratuity for the reason that there has beer a breach of contract between the several
promisors and a failure to carry out, as between themselves their mutual agreement." Id.
at 35.3.
8. Miller v. '.Vcstern College of Toledo, 177 Il1. 280, 52 N.E. 432(1898); School
District of City of Kansas v. Stocking, 138 Mo. 672, 40 S.W. 656 (1897). "That doctrine
rpromissory estoppel] need not he applied . . . where a request . . . can ne 'niplied
from the subscription agreement." I & I Holding Corporation v. Gainsburg, 276 N.Y. 427,
12 N.E.2d 532, 534(1938).
9. Promissory estoppel is said to be distinguished from ordinary estoppel in that the
promise relies on a premise and not on a misstatement or misrepresentation of existint
fact. I Williston on Contracts 494(Rev. ed. 1946). Since the detriment incurred is not.
in fact, the motive for the promise, the concept of promissory estoppel would seem to he a
substitution for consideration or an exception to its ordinary requirements. Allegheny Col-
lege v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173
(1927).
10. See James Baird! Co. v. Bimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1933).
11. E.g., Miller v. Western College, 177 Ill. 280, 52 N.E."-432 (1898) (erection of
boarding hall); Kueka College v. Ray, 167 N.Y. 96, 60 N.E.325 .(1901) (to found a
college).
12. 1 & I Holding Corporation v. Gainshurg, .276 N.Y. 427, 12 N.E:2d .532 (1938).
13. E.g, IRothenherger v. Glick, 22 Id. App. 288, 52 N.E., 811"-(1899); I & I -Hold-
ing Corporation v. Gaiusburg, 276 N.Y. 427, 12 N:E.2d'.532 (1938) Kueka College v.
Ray, .167 N.Y. 96, 60 N.E. 325 (1901).
-14. E.g., Rogers Lumber Co. v. Clark, 52 N.D:-007' 204 N.W. 8 :(192,); Standard
Sewing Machine Company v. Church, 11 N.D._ 420,92 N.W. 805 -(192S).
15. .-Davis Sewing Machine Company v. Richards, 118 'U.S.- 524 (1685); Standard
Sewing Milchine Co. v. Church, 11 N.D. 420, 92.N:W:-805 -(1925)' .•Sea also -Rogers
Lumber'.Co, v. Clark, 52 N.D. 607, 204 N.W. 184 (.192).
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to do so would abridge the guarantor's right of revocation, a right often
expressly protected by statute.' 6
But in the instant case, the controversy is between the principal debtor
and the guarantor. Undoubtedly the principal debtor could bind the guar-
antor to his promise to make future advancements, if there were a con-
sideration running between them. The doctrine of promissory estoppel
may serve as a substitute for a consideration, if the principal debtor has
acted in reliance on the promise. 17 The result of the application of these
two rules, while logical, does create a limitation on the privilege of re-
voking fronj the promisor's standpoint, as the instant case illustrates. The
same ruling could be applied in a commercial transaction, since the prom-
issory estoppel rule, by definition, is not limited to charitable transactions.'
It. should be pointed out, however, that the courts have been reluctant to
apply that rule to commercial transactions, the argument being that in
such cases mere reliance upon a gratutitous promise is not a sufficient con-
siderationX to bind the promisor.", The result reached, in any event, seems
to be in line with the hyper-generous attitude of the courts when dealing
with charitable subscriptions.
GERRY 'GLASER
NEGLIGENCE - INVITEES AND LICENSEES - DUTY OF OWNER OR OCCU-
PIER OF LAND TO THIRD PERSON ACCOMPANYING CUSTOMER. - Plaintiff's
husband parked his car near an unguarded grease pit on defendant's serv-
ice station lot; the pit was obscured by another auto which blocked off
the station lights. After completing his business, the husband waited in
the station office for the plaintiff. She crossed the street and walked to-
ward the wrong car, whereupon he directed her toward his car. She then
changed her direction, took a few steps and fell into the pit. The Supreme
Court, in affirming a directed verdict for the defendant, held that since the
plaintiff was not within the class of business visitors, defendant had no
duty to protect her from hidden defects. When her husband completed his
business his status reverted to that of a licensee, and she had no greater
rights than he. ROBILLARD v. TILLOTSON, 103 A.2d 524 (Vt. 1954).
Most authorities agree that a business invitee must be someone on the
premises with an express or implied invitation, and must benefit the owner
actually or potentially., The licensee, in contrast, is on the premises by
permission or sufferance only; anticipated benefit to the owner from his
presence is not necessary. 2 The duty of the landowner to a business invitee
16. N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §22-0106 provides: "A mere offer to guaranty is not
hinding until notice of its acceptance is communicated by the guarantee to the guarantor.
An absolute guaranty is binding upon the guarantor without notice of acceptance."
17. See Florida Asphalt Pavement Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 76 F.2d
326 (5th Cir. 1935); Restatement, Contracts §75(2) (1933).
18. See note 1 supra.
19. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845). "... If generally applied it [promissory
estoppel] would much extend liablility on promises, and that it is at present opposed to
the great weight ot authority." 1 Williston on Contracts 502 (Rev. ed. 1936).
1. See Restatement, Torts §332 (1934); Prosser, Torts §79 (1941); 65 C.J.S., Negli-
gence §43(1).
2. See Restatement, Torts §330 (1934); Prosser, Torts §78 (1941); Cooley, Torts
§340 (Throckmorton's ed. 1930).
